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NOTES
ANALYZING THE CONTINUITY OF
INTEREST DOCTRINE: PAULSEN V.
COMMISSIONER
N 1976 Harold and Marie Paulsen exchanged guaranty stock' in Com-
merce Savings and Loan Association, a state chartered savings and loan
association, for savings accounts and time certificates of deposit 2 in Citi-
zens Federal Savings and Loan Association, a federally chartered mutual
savings and loan association. 3 The associations arranged the exchange pur-
suant to a plan of merger. 4 The capital structure of Commerce had con-
sisted of guaranty stock and several classes of savings accounts. Under the
governing state law only holders of guaranty stock had a proprietary interest
in Commerce's earnings and assets. 5 As a mutual savings and loan associa-
tion Citizens had no stock. 6 Savings accounts and certificates of deposit
1. Guaranty stock consists of permanent stock that is subordinate to creditors' claims.
In re Pacific Coast Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d 134, 99 P.2d 251, 255 (1940). Savings and
loan associations issue guaranty stock to establish reserve funds for the protection of other
investors in the association. Id.
2. A savings account is a demand account that provides for the payment of interest to
the depositor. 1 W. SCHLICHTING, T. RICE & J. COOPER, BANKING LAW § 9.02[2] (1982).
Deposits that the bank agrees to relinquish to the depositor after a specified period at a prede-
termined rate of interest qualify as time certificates of deposits. Id. Any premature with-
drawal of the deposit by the depositor results in a forfeiture of interest. Id.
3. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board authorized and chartered Citizens under the
provisions of 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1982) and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Id.§ 1464(b)(l)(A) authorizes an association to raise capital in the form of savings deposits,
shares, or other accounts such as passbook accounts and time certificates of deposit. The
statute does not authorize the issuance of stock as a means of raising capital.
4. The plan of merger provided for the exchange of each share of guaranty stock in
Commerce for a $12 deposit in a passbook savings account in Citizens, subject to the restric-
tion that the shareholders could not withdraw such deposits within one year from the date of
the merger. Alternatively, Commerce stockholders could exchange their stock for time certifi-
cates of deposits in Citizens with maturities ranging from one to ten years. Each Commerce
savings account would convert to an identical Citizens savings account.
5. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 564 (9th Cir. 1983). Commerce operated
under the laws of Washington, its state of incorporation. The bylaws of Commerce stated that
both the holders of guaranty stock and savings accounts had a proprietary interest in the assets
or net earnings of the association. The bylaws further stated that any bylaw provision conflict-
ing with state law was to be deemed to conform to the state law. The Washington Revenue
Code provides that each guaranty stockholder of an association had a proprietary interest in
the assets and net earnings of the association, and no other member of the association had any
such interest. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 33.48.080 (Supp. 1981).
6. The capital structure of mutual savings and loans consists of share accounts, deposits,
or time certificates of deposit. The capital of stock savings and loans, however, consists of
guaranty or capital stock in addition to share accounts. Comment, Classification of Share-
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comprised the only form of ownership interest in the association; however,
Citizens shareholders had the right to vote, the right to dividend distribu-
tions of the association's net earnings, and the right to a pro rata distribution
of any remaining assets after a solvent dissolution.
7
Relying on sections 354(a)8 and 368(a)(1)(A)9 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as amended, the Paulsens excluded the gain realized as a re-
sult of the merger from their 1976 federal income tax return. The Internal
Revenue Service issued a federal income tax deficiency notice to the Paulsens
requiring them to recognize in 1976 the gain realized from the exchange.
The Paulsens subsequently sought a redetermination of the deficiency in the
United States Tax Court, asserting that an exchange of stock in Commerce
for an equity interest in Citizens deserved tax-free treatment under sections
354 and 368(a)(1)(A) of the Code. The IRS contended that the merger of
the two associations did not meet the requirements of a tax-free reorganiza-
tion under section 368(a)(1)(A) because the Paulsens did not receive a signif-
icant proprietary interest in the mutual savings and loan association.
In holding for the plaintiffs, the Tax Court held that savings accounts
constitute proprietary interests that satisfy the continuity of interest required
of a reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(A) of the Code; therefore, the
Paulsens did not have to recognize gain from the exchange. 10 The IRS ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The
appellate court reversed the tax court's holding and held that the interests at
issue, although ownership interests for some purposes,1 did not possess suf-
ficient equity characteristics to render the merger a tax-free reorganization. 12
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, affirmed: The exchange of
stock for passbook accounts and certificates of deposit pursuant to a plan of
merger fails to qualify as a tax-free reorganization. Paulsen v. Commissioner,
105 S. Ct. 627, 83 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1985).
holder Interest in Mutual Savings and Loans for Purposes of Nontaxable Reorganizations Under
LR.C. §§ 354 and 361, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 178 n.8 (1984).
7. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1983).
8. I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (1982) provides: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or
securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of reorgani-
zation, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a
party to the reorganization."
9. Id. § 368(a)(l)(A) provides that the term "reorganization" means a statutory merger
or consolidation. Id. § 368(a)(1)(C) defines a reorganization as the exchange of voting stock in
one corporation for substantially all of the properties of another corporation.
10. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 291, 303 (1982). The Tax Court had not previously
considered the question whether mutual savings accounts constitute stock for purposes of the
nonrecognition provisions of § 3 54(a) of the Code. Id. at 298. The court noted, however, that
a number of other courts that had considered the issue uniformly held that the receipt of
savings accounts in a mutual savings and loan association in exchange for stock satisfied the
continuity of interest test. Id.; for a discussion of the cases cited by the Tax Court, see text
accompanying infra notes 29-40. The Tax Court held that the mutual shares qualified as
stock, based on judicial precedent set by other courts and the need for certainty in the law. 78
T.C. at 303.
11. See supra text accompanying note 7 (discussing proprietary rights associated with Cit-
izens mutual shares).
12. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 566 (9th Cir. 1983).
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I. REQUIREMENTS OF A TAX-FREE REORGANIZATION
A. Statutory Requirements
A disposition of property, including stock, generally results in a gain or
loss that a taxpayer includes when calculating gross income.1 3 One excep-
tion to the general rule involves corporate reorganizations. 14 Section 354 of
the Code provides for nonrecognition of gain by a shareholder of a corpora-
tion that exchanges stock or securities with another corporation pursuant to
a plan of reorganization. 15 A transaction qualifies for tax-free treatment
under the nonrecognition provisions of section 354 only if it complies with
the definition of reorganization under section 368 of the Code. 16
Section 368(a)(1)(A) extends tax-free treatment to an exchange of stock or
securities in connection with a statutory merger or consolidation. 17 Literal
compliance with the statutory provisions of section 368, however, will not
always qualify a merger for tax-free treatment. The exchange must also sat-
isfy the judicially created doctrine of continuity of interest. 8
B. Continuity of Interest Doctrine
The continuity of interest doctrine requires shareholders of an acquired
corporation to retain a proprietary interest in the surviving corporation in
order to avoid recognition of gain realized in a merger. 19 The courts created
13. I.R.C. §§ 61, 1001(c) (1982).
14. See id. §§ 61, 354, 361, 1001. Section 1001 of the Code provides that the taxpayer
must recognize gain or loss resulting from the disposition of property unless otherwise pro-
vided by the Code. Id. § 1001. The corporate reorganization provisions of §§ 354 and 361
constitute an exception to this general rule. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 14.01 (4th ed. 1979).
15. I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (1982); see supra note 8.
16. See supra note 9.
17. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1982); see supra note 9.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
19. The continuity of interest doctrine originated in Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932). In that case one corporation exchanged its assets for cash
and short-term notes of another corporation. Although the transaction met the statutory re-
quirements of a reorganization, the court held that the exchange of cash and short-term notes
for the acquired company's stock did not constitute a tax-free reorganization. The court noted
that congressional intent required the owners of the acquired corporation to retain a continuity
of interest in the surviving corporation in order to receive tax-free treatment. Id. at 940. The
court concluded that:
In defining "reorganization," section 203 of the Revenue Act [which defined
reorganization as in I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A)] gives the widest room for all kinds of
changes in corporate structure, but does not abandon the primary requisite that
there must be some continuity of interest on the part of the transferor corpora-
tion or its stockholders in order to secure exemption.
Id. The following year the Supreme Court, citing Cortland, adopted the continuity of interest
doctrine in Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933). The Court
stated that the transferor "must acquire an interest in the affairs of the purchasing company
more definite than that incident to ownership of its short-term purchase-money notes." Id. at
470.
During the 1930s and 1940s the Court further refined the continuity of interest doctrine. In
Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935), the Supreme Court held that voting
trust certificates constituted the equivalent of stock and possessed sufficient equity to satisfy
the continuity of interest doctrine. Id. at 385-86. The Court, however, added another require-
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the continuity of interest requirement to distinguish between mere sales and
valid reorganizations in which shareholders exchange an intangible invest-
ment in one corporation for an intangible investment in another corpora-
tion.20 The doctrine prevents taxpayers from securing tax-free treatment of
a transaction through literal compliance with the Code when the substance
of the transaction does not warrant nonrecognition treatment.
The Supreme Court has had several opportunities to define the type of
interest that a shareholder must receive in order to satisfy the continuity of
interest requirement. 21 The Court has held that receipt of cash or short-
term notes by a shareholder does not satisfy the continuity of interest test.
22
The Court reasoned that the shareholder, by receiving cash or its equivalent,
has either sold his investment interest in the corporation or has become a
creditor of the corporation rather than retaining an ownership interest. 23 In
addition, the Court has held that bonds received pursuant to a plan of reor-
ganization do not constitute equity interests that satisfy the continuity of
interest doctrine.24 Thus, to maintain a proprietary interest in the surviving
corporation, the shareholders of the acquired corporation must receive stock
or some other form of equity interest.
25
ment to the doctrine by stating that the interest received by the acquiree "must be definite and
material; it must represent a substantial part of the value of the thing transferred." Id. at 385.
In John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935), the Court held that preferred stock
possessed sufficient equity interest to satisfy the continuity of interest doctrine even though the
preferred stock conferred no voting rights. Id. at 377. In LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415
(1940), the Court held that an acquisition of all of a corporation's properties for cash and
bonds did not constitute a reorganization that satisfied the continuity of interest doctrine. Id.
at 416. LeTulle narrowed the scope of an earlier Supreme Court decision that held that mort-
gage bonds possessed adequate equity interest to satisfy the continuity of interest doctrine. See
Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 387, 389 (1935). For a more detailed discussion of the judicial
history of the continuity of interest doctrine, see B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 14,
14.11; Faber, Continuity of Interest and Business Enterprise,- Is it Time to Bury Some Sacred
Cows?, 34 TAX LAW. 239, 240-50 (1981).
20. The Treasury codified the continuity of interest doctrine in Treasury Regulation
§ 1.368-1. The regulation provides that the purpose of the reorganization provisions of the
Code is to exempt from tax certain exchanges resulting from readjustments of corporate struc-
tures. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955). The regulation further mandates as prerequisites to a
reorganization under the Code a continuity of the business enterprise under the modified form
and a continuity of interest on the part of the owners of the acquired enterprise. Id. See B.
BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1148 (5th ed. 1980). Treasury Regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury constitute the most authoritative pronounce-
ments on the Code. The regulations serve as a major source of guidance by supplying the
taxpayer with an interpretation of the Code. Id. Interpretive agency regulations, including
Treasury Regulations, have the force and effect of law; however, the courts may overrule them
as inconsistent with the Code as well as for abuse of discretion. Id. In reality, the courts
frequently accord the regulations the force of law and seldom overrule them. Id. Revenue
Rulings provide an interpretation of substantive tax law for the purpose of promoting uniform
application of the tax laws. Revenue Rulings reflect the current policies of the IRS, but do not
have the force and effect of law. Id. at 1149.
21. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 387 (1935);
Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935); John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296
U.S. 374 (1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
22. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 470 (1933).
23. Id. at 469; see B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 14, at 14-20.
24. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 416 (1940).
25. Id. at 420-21; Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 387, 389 (1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Stor-
age Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 466-67 (1933); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commis-
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In reorganizations involving mutual savings and loan associations, owner-
ship interests possess both debt and equity characteristics. 26 Because the
nature of the ownership interest has two facets, application of the continuity
of interest doctrine to these situations presents considerable difficulty. 27
Consequently, various courts have attempted to determine whether the re-
ceipt of a mutual share account qualifies as a substantial proprietary or eq-
uity interest sufficient to satisfy the continuity of interest doctrine. 28
II. CLASSIFICATION OF MUTUAL SHARE ACCOUNTS: THE SAVINGS &
LOAN CASES
The issue of whether a savings account in a savings and loan association
constitutes debt or equity first arose in Home Savings & Loan v. United
States (Home 1).29 Home I involved the merger of two stock savings and loan
associations. Under the plan of merger the acquiring savings and loan asso-
ciation agreed to purchase all of the outstanding guaranty stock of the ac-
quired association for cash. In addition, the depositors and shareholders of
the acquired association would exchange their share accounts for similar
share accounts in the acquiror. After the merger the depositors of the ac-
quired association would have the same pro rata continuing interest in the
acquiror as they had before the merger. Under state law the depositors pos-
sessed proprietary interests associated with their shares such as the right to
vote and the right to elect members of the board of directors.30 The IRS
contended that the transaction did not constitute a reorganization under sec-
tion 368(a)(1)(A) of the Code, but that the merger represented a liquidation
of a subsidiary pursuant to section 332.31 The district court determined that
share accounts qualify as stock, and since the acquiring association
sioner, 60 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1932); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b), supra note 20
(continuity of interest doctrine). In a recent article two attorneys concluded that stockholders
of the acquired corporation must receive an equity interest in the acquiring corporation to
satisfy the continuity of interest requirement. Debt, in any form, will not qualify as an equity
interest. McGaffey & Hunt, Continuity of Shareholder Interest in Acquisitive Corporate Reor-
ganizations, 59 TAXES 659, 661 (1981).
26. Debt characteristics include the ability to convert the shares to cash on demand, the
presence of a fixed rate of return, and the nonsubordination of the shares to the claims of
creditors. Equity characteristics consist of the right to vote, the right to share in liquidation
proceeds of the association, and the right to elect members of the board of directors. See, e.g.,
West Side Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 411 (6th Cir. 1974); Everett
v. United States, 448 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1971); Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United
States, 223 F. Supp. 134, 135 (S.D. Cal. 1963); see also, Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United
States, 607 F.2d 970, 974-76 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (discussion of debt and equity characteristics of
mutual shares).
27. Comment, supra note 6, at 178.
28. West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 409-11 (6th Cir.
1974); Everett v. United States, 448 F.2d 357, 359-60 (10th Cir. 1971); Home Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 134, 135 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
United States, 607 F.2d 970, 973-74 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
29. 223 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
30. Id. at 135.
31. Section 332 involves the merger of a subsidiary company into the parent company.
I.R.C. § 332 (1982). The section requires the parent corporation to own 80% of the total
combined voting stock of the subsidiary corporation. Id.
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purchased only the guaranty stock of the acquired association, it did not
own eighty percent of the total voting power as required by section 332.32
The court recognized that the controlling factor in categorizing the deposi-
tors' interests was the "quality of rights, preferences and privileges related to
such interest."' 33 The court held that the merger constituted a reorganiza-
tion within section 354(a)(1)(A) and that the transaction satisfied the con-
tinuity of interest test.34
The problem of classifying mutual share accounts arose again in Everett v.
United States.35 Everett involved the acquisition of a stock savings and loan
association by a mutual savings and loan association. Under the plan of
merger holders of full paid shares36 and savings shares37 in the stock associa-
tion exchanged their shares for like shares in the mutual association.
The share account holders, who possessed over ninety-seven percent of the
voting shares in the acquired association, claimed nonrecognition treatment
of the exchange under section 368(a)(1)(C) of the Code.38 The government
questioned whether the full paid shares and savings shares received from the
mutual association qualified as voting stock within the meaning of section
368(a)(1)(C). The Government conceded that the shares possessed some
equity characteristics, such as the right to vote and the right to share in
liquidation proceeds, but contended that such interests more closely resem-
bled a creditor's interests. The court recognized that the savings shares had
some attributes of debt, but noted that the shares also possessed many char-
acteristics of a proprietary interest. 39 The court, therefore, held that the full
paid shares and savings shares constituted voting stock within the meaning
of section 368(a)(1)(C) and thus met the requirements of the continuity of
interest test.4°
West Side Federal Savings & Loan v. United States4t involved a fact situa-
tion similar to the one in Everett. Relying on Home I, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that a statutory merger of a state chartered savings
and loan association, which had capital stock in addition to savings ac-
counts, into a mutual savings and loan association with savings accounts as
the only capital constituted a tax-free reorganization within the meaning of
32. 223 F. Supp. at 135.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 448 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971).
36. Full paid shares consist of capital stock that is similar to stock issued by a corporation
because the purchaser pays par value for the stock. Mott v. Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 142
Or. 344, 20 P.2d 236, 239 (1933) (citing J. SUNDHEIM, LAW OF BUILDING AND LOAN Assocs.
§ 37 (2d ed. 1922)).
37. See supra note 2 for a discussion of savings shares.
38. For description of reorganization under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C), see supra note 9.
39. 448 F.2d at 360. The court emphasized that the shares possessed proprietary rights,
such as the right to vote, the right to participate in the earnings of the association, and the
right to share in liquidation proceeds. Id.
40. Id. The court referred to I.R.C. § 7701(a)(7) (1982), which provides that the term
"stock" includes shares in an association. 448 F.2d at 359-60.
41. 494 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1974).
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section 368(a)(1)(A). 42 The plan of merger provided for the mutual savings
and loan association to acquire all of the assets and liabilities of the stock
savings and loan association. Each savings account holder in the acquired
association was to receive a savings account in the acquiror. The IRS recog-
nized that the transaction qualified as a statutory merger within the meaning
of section 368(a)(1)(A), but contended that the continuity of interest require-
ment had not been met. The IRS argued that a withdrawable savings share
in a federal savings and loan association amounted to no more than the
equivalent of a demand deposit bank account.
The court overruled the government's contention and concluded that the
transaction met the continuity of interest test.43 The court noted that the
charter of the acquiring savings and loan association stated that holders of
savings accounts who had made an application for withdrawal would remain
holders of savings accounts until their funds were paid and would not be-
come creditors.4 The court further reasoned that in exchange for their
stock, the stockholders of the acquired association received shares constitut-
ing the sole proprietary interest in the federal mutual savings and loan asso-
ciation. 45  The court then focused on the proprietary rights that the
shareholders received and did not concentrate solely on their rights as
creditors. 46
The Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result in Home Savings & Loan
Association v. United States (Home II). 47 Home H involved the acquisition
of two stock savings and loan associations by another stock savings and loan
association. The capital of each of the participants in the acquisition was in
the form of both guaranty stock and withdrawable shares. The acquiring
savings and loan association purchased the guaranty stock of both acquired
savings and loan associations for cash and exchanged the withdrawable
shares of the acquired associations for withdrawable shares of the acquiror.
The Ninth Circuit held that the withdrawable shares and investment cer-
42. Id. at 411. The court discussed the judicial history and development of the continuity
of interest doctrine, the definitions in § 7701 of the Code, and the hybrid nature of share
accounts in mutual savings and loan associations. Id. at 406-10; see notes 19, 40 and accompa-
nying text.
43. 494 F.2d at 411. The court examined the position of the IRS with respect to mergers
and consolidations of savings and loan associations. Id. at 409-10. In Rev. Rul. 3, 1969-1 C.B.
103, the Commissioner ruled that the statutory merger of two mutual savings and loan associa-
tions qualified as a tax-free reorganization. In Rev. Rul. 6, 1969-1 C.B. 104, however, a
merger of a state chartered stock association into a federally chartered mutual association did
not qualify as a tax-free reorganization. Finally, in Rev. Rul. 646, 1969-2 C.B. 54, a merger of
a mutual association into a stock association was characterized as constituting a tax-free reor-
ganization. For a discussion of the purpose of Revenue Rulings, see supra note 20.
44. 494 F.2d at 411.
45. Id.
46. Id. The court stated that it would analyze the facts to determine whether a share-
holder received a proprietary interest, but would not determine whether such interest in-
creased or decreased as a result of the exchange. But see Southwest Natural Gas Co. v.
Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1951) (insufficient continuity of interest where
stock received represented less than 1% of the consideration).
47. 514 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975).
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tificates constituted debt rather than equity based on several factors.48 First,
the court examined the terms of the share accounts, noting that the share-
holders could receive cash virtually on demand. 49 The court assigned little
weight to the fact that share account holders possessed voting rights since
holders of debt can also have voting rights.50 In reaching its decision, the
court relied upon relevant aspects of California law5 and of the federal tax
laws5 2 and cited authors from the savings and loan industry. 53 The Ninth
Circuit stated, however, that it might have weighed the equity features of the
mutual shares more heavily if the transaction had not also involved guaranty
stock.54
The court concluded by discussing two cases, Home 1 55 and Everett.56
The court ostensibly overruled Home I by stating that the result reached in
Home I conflicted with the holding in Home JJ.57 The court refused to
express an opinion regarding the IRS's attempt to distinguish Everett and
Home II on the ground that the shareholders of a mutual savings and loan
association have more extensive equity rights than shareholders of a stock
savings and loan association. 58 The court acknowledged, however, that the
issues involved in the merger of two mutual savings associations differed
from the questions raised in Home H. 59
A recent Court of Claims case, Capital Savings & Loan Association v.
United States,60 addressed the classification of mutual share accounts based
48. 514 F.2d at 1205.
49. Id. at 1206. The court compared the terms of the shares and certificates with guar-
anty stock and noted that holders of stock have no right to withdraw cash from the associa-
tion. Id.
50. Id.
51. Under California law stockholders incur individual liability to the creditors of the
association, including holders of investment certificates, up to the amount of the association's
permanent capital in addition to the sum invested in stock. On the other hand, shareholders,
certificate holders, and borrowers have no liability to creditors. Id. at 1207. The Supreme
Court of California had earlier categorized withdrawable shareholders as creditors of a guar-
anty stock association. Id. (citing In re Pacific Coast Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d 134, 99
P.2d 251, 254 (1940)).
52. 514 F.2d at 1207-08. The court stated that § 591 of the Internal Revenue Code per-
mits the association to deduct amounts paid on deposits or withdrawable accounts. An associ-
ation, however, may not deduct dividends paid on guaranty stock. Id. For a discussion of
I.R.C. § 591, see infra note 71. The court further discussed § 593(b)(1)(B), which provides
that "deposits and withdrawable accounts" are treated alike in computing one of the limita-
tions placed upon additions to the bad debt reserve. 514 F.2d at 1208.
53. 514 F.2d at 1208 (citing E. PRATHER, SAVINGS ACCOUNT 296-97 (4th ed. 1970); R.
RUSSELL, SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS 132 (2d ed. 1960)).
54. 514 F.2d at 1206.
55. 223 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Cal. 1963); see supra text accompanying note 29.
56. 448 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971); see supra text accompanying note 35.
57. 514 F.2d at 1208 n.16.
58. Id. at 1208. The court recognized that in some cases mutual shareholders possess
substantial proprietary rights. In such cases, the debt and equity characteristics of mutual
shares and guaranty stock merge and become inseparable. The shareholders in Home II, how-
ever, did not possess such substantial proprietary rights. Id. at 1208-09.
59. Id. at 1208-09. Mutual shares constitute the only equity interests involved in the
merger of two mutual savings and loans, whereas in Home II the equity interest consisted of
guaranty stock in addition to mutual shares.
60. 607 F.2d 970 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
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on facts similar to those in Everett and West Side.6 1 Analagous to the share
account holders in those cases, Capital Savings account holders possessed
the right to vote, the right to elect the association's board of directors, and
the power to amend the association's bylaws and articles of incorporation.
The shareholders could also participate in the liquidation proceeds of the
association, but only after the association had satisfied the claims of its
creditors.
The government urged the court to classify a savings and loan account as
the equivalent of cash, the receipt of which violates the continuity of interest
test. The court rejected the government's argument, noting that the share
accounts have characteristics of both debt and equity. 62 The court held that
the merger of a savings and loan association with outstanding guaranty stock
into a mutual savings and loan association without stock satisfied the con-
tinuity of interest test because the debt characteristics of the shares did not
outweigh their equity features. 63 In reaching the conclusion that the shares
constituted stock or securities as required by the nonrecognition provisions
of the Code, the court emphasized that the Capital savings accounts com-
prised the only interests with proprietary and equity rights available to the
stockholders of the acquired association in exchange for their stock.
64
As seen from the foregoing discussion of the savings and loan association
cases, the majority of lower courts have consistently held that mutual shares
constitute proprietary interests that satisfy the continuity of interest doc-
trine. Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit categorized withdrawable
shares and investment certificates of deposit as debt and not equity. The
Supreme Court did not address the issue of classifying mutual shares for the
purposes of the nonrecognition provisions of section 354(a) of the Code until
Paulsen v. Commissioner.
III. PA ULSEN V. COMMISSIONER
In Paulsen the Supreme Court resolved the conflict between the circuits
on the issue of whether passbook savings accounts and time certificates of
deposit of mutual savings and loan associations constitute equity interests
for the purpose of satisfying the continuity of interest doctrine. The major-
ity opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, recognized the hybrid nature of
61. In an acquisition similar to the mergers in Everett and West Side, stockholders of
Franklin Savings & Loan Association exchanged their stock for mutual shares in Capital Sav-
ings & Loan Association. The transaction qualified as a reorganization within the literal lan-
guage of § 368 of the Code; however, the acquisition would not qualify as a tax-free
reorganization unless the mutual shares of Capital constituted equity interests. Id. at 974.
62. Id. at 974.
63. Id. at 975.
64. Id. at 976-77. The court stated: "[A]s the law assumes that someone must own an
association or corporation, we join the courts in West Side, supra and Everett, supra, in refus-
ing to reach a decision which illogically implies that Capital is an association without owners




mutual shares, which have both debt and equity characteristics. 6 5 The ma-
jority concluded, however, that the debt characteristics of the mutual shares
greatly outweighed the equity attributes.
66
The Court observed that the equity in a mutual savings and loan associa-
tion diffuses throughout all of the depositors, compared to equity in a stock
association, which concentrates in the stockholders. 67 The ownership inter-
est of each shareholder in relation to the total value of the shares, therefore,
is much smaller in a mutual association than in a stock association. 68 The
majority found the voting rights of shareholders to be insignificant because
shareholders could acquire only a limited number of votes and each loan
diluted the votes of the shareholders.
69
The Court then compared the payment of dividends on net earnings of the
association to payment of interest on savings accounts. The majority agreed
with the appellate court's conclusion that the payment of dividends at a
fixed, preannounced rate rendered the dividend payments nothing more than
interest payments.70 In support of this conclusion the majority noted that
the Code treats these dividends as deductible like interest on bank accounts
rather than as a nondeductible return of capital like dividends of a stock
corporation. 71 Finally, the Court determined that the right to participate in
the net proceeds of a solvent liquidation did not constitute a significant part
of the value of the shares. 72 Because the Court considered the possibility of
a solvent liquidation of a mutual savings and loan association to be a very
speculative event, the Court found that the liquidation rights had little or no
65. 105 S. Ct. 627, 631, 83 L. Ed. 2d 540, 546 (1985). For cases discussing the hybrid
nature of mutual shares, see supra note 26.
66. 105 S. Ct. at 633, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 549. The majority found that the equity attributes
associated with the shares contributed an insubstantial value to the shares when compared to
the debt attributes of such shares. For a discussion of the valuation of equity and debt attrib-
utes of mutual shares, see text accompanying infra notes 72-77. Justice O'Connor noted in the
dissent that the only support for the Court's separate valuation is Rev. Rul. 265, 1969-1 C.B.
109, which no other court had previously followed. 105 S. Ct. at 638, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 555. For
a discussion advocating abolition of the all-or-nothing characterization, see Comment, supra
note 6, at 194-201.
67. 105 S. Ct. at 631, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 546-47.
68. Id.
69. Id., 83 L. Ed. 2d at 547. Holders of savings accounts received one vote per $100 on
deposit; however, no shareholder could receive more than 400 votes. Id. The voting power of
a shareholder was diluted every time a loan was made because each borrower received one
vote. Id. The addition of a depositor also diluted the voting power of any shareholder who
possessed the maximum number of votes.
70. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the dividend distributions
were essentially equivalent to the interest paid by stock savings and loan associations. Paulsen
v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1983). The court of appeals noted that deposi-
tors act based on the rate of return on their investment and the security of their deposits. Id. at
568.
71. 105 S. Ct. at 631-32, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 549. I.R.C. § 591(a) (1982) provides:
In the case of mutual savings banks... and other savings institutions chartered
... under Federal or State law, there shall be allowed as deductions in comput-
ing taxable income amounts paid to, or credited to the accounts of, depositors or
holders of accounts as dividends or interest on their deposits or withdrawable
accounts ....
Id.; see supra note 52.




After reaching its decision that the equity features of the shares were in-
substantial, the Court discussed the predominant debt characteristics of the
mutual shares. 74 The majority observed first that the passbook accounts and
time certificates of deposit were not subordinate to the claims of the credi-
tors of the association. 75 The nonsubordination of the shares supported the
government's contention that the share account holders constituted creditors
rather than equity owners of the association. Furthermore, the shareholders
could withdraw their deposits by giving thirty days' notice to the association.
Although the depositors could not withdraw their funds for one year follow-
ing the merger, the Court found this restriction to be more like a delay in
payment than a determinative alteration in the character of the instru-
ments.76 Reasoning that the debt value of the shares equalled the face value
because no one would pay more for the shares than their face value, the
Court concluded that the equity features added practically no incremental
value to the shares. 77
At the conclusion of its analysis, the majority reviewed prior case law. 78
In Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co. the Supreme Court had stated that for an
exchange to qualify for nonrecognition treatment, the interest retained in the
surviving corporation "must be definite and material; it must represent a
substantial part of the value of the thing transferred. '79 The majority deter-
mined that the Paulsens' exchange failed to satisfy the continuity of interest
requirement because the retained equity interest in the mutual savings and
loan association was unquantifiably small and, therefore, did not form a sub-
stantial part of the value of the surrendered stock. 80
The Court next attempted to reconcile its holding with Revenue Ruling
69-3.81 In the ruling the Commissioner stated that a merger of a mutual
association into another mutual association or a stock association would
qualify as a tax-free reorganization. 8 2 The Court explained that when two
mutual associations merge, the exchange meets the Minnesota Tea Co. test of
materiality because the proprietary interest represented by the shares re-
ceived, even though small, equals the proprietary interest represented by the
shares exchanged.8 3 According to the majority, when a mutual association
merges with a stock association, the shareholders increase their proprietary
73. Id.
74. Id., 83 L. Ed. 2d at 547-48.
75. Id., 83 L. Ed. 2d at 548.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id., 83 L. Ed. 2d at 549. The court noted that the mutual shares did not differ signifi-
cantly from short-term notes, which the Court had found to be cash equivalents. Pinellas Ice
& Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 468-69 (1933). See supra note 22-23 and
accompanying text.
79. 296 U.S. 378, 385 (1935); see supra note 19.
80. 105 S. Ct. at 632, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 548.
81. Rev. Rul. 69-3, 69-1 C.B. 103. For discussion of the ruling, see supra note 43.
82. Id.
83. 105 S. Ct. at 633, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 549.
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interest by exchanging mutual shares for stock. 84 In Paulsen, however, the
shareholders' equity interest diminished because the proprietary interest rep-
resented by the mutual shares was insubstantial when compared to the pro-
prietary interest of the guaranty stock.
The majority concluded by stating that its holding did not conflict with an
earlier decision 85 that withdrawable mutual association shares constituted
securities as defined in section 3(a)(10) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934.86 Noting that the purpose of the Securities Act differed from that of
the Tax Code, the Court found that a liberal construction of the definition of
security in the Securities Act was warranted, but declined to construe the
scope of the reorganization provisions in a similar manner. 87
Justice O'Connor, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger,
stated that the majority's holding conflicted with the decisions of all courts
that had considered similar transactions and thus introduced uncertainty
into the area of tax law. 88 Justice O'Connor further argued that the mutual
share account holders retained all of the relevant rights of corporate stock-
holders. 89 She noted that share account holders possess all of the equity in a
mutual association to the extent that any equity exists.90 Justice O'Connor
also disagreed with the majority's separate valuation of the debt and equity
characteristics of the same instrument.91 Again she noted the lack of judi-
cial precedent for the majority's action. Finally, Justice O'Connor criticized
the majority's reasoning that a merger between mutual associations qualifies
as tax-free, but a merger of a stock association into a mutual association does
not satisfy the definite and material test of Minnesota Tea Co. 92 Justice
O'Connor insisted that the equity interest represented by the mutual share
accounts constituted the sole ownership interest in the association and that
the holders of these accounts received them in exchange for an equivalent
sole ownership interest in the stock savings and loan association. Thus, the
equity interest that the shareholders received equalled the equity interest
that they surrendered. 93
Justice O'Connor concluded the dissenting opinion by stating that the ma-
jority's holding would discourage mergers entered into for valid business
84. Id. But see Roebling v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 810, 813-14 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 773 (1944). In Roebling the court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the court
should determine whether the continuity of interest requirement was met by comparing the
taxpayer's rights before and after the merger. The taxpayer in that case argued that although
he had no equity interest before the merger, the exchange satisfied the continuity of interest
doctrine because he received a similar interest in the acquiring corporation. Id.
85. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
86. 105 S. Ct. at 634, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 549-50; see 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1982).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 634, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 550.
89. Id. at 636, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 552. The shareholders had the right to vote, the right to
share in net assets on liquidation, and the right to share in profits of the association. Id.
90. Id.; see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
91. 105 S. Ct. at 636, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 552-53.
92. See supra note 19.
93. 105 S. Ct. at 636, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 553.
[Vol. 39
NOTES
purposes without regard to the economic benefits of such mergers.94 She
advocated a test that would treat a hybrid instrument that has the principal
attributes of equity ownership as equity for the purposes of the continuity of
interest requirement.95 For these reasons Justice O'Connor would have re-
versed the appellate court decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Paulsen v. Commissioner the Supreme Court held that the merger of a
stock savings and loan association into a mutual savings and loan association
does not qualify as a tax-free reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(A) of
the Code. The Court found that the plan of merger did not satisfy the con-
tinuity of interest requirement because the debt characteristics of the mutual
shares that the stockholders in the acquired association received greatly out-
weighed the equity attributes. The dissent contended that courts should not
value the debt and equity features of such shares separately, but should treat
the shares as equity if they retain the principal characteristics of equity own-
ership. Paulsen gave the Court its first opportunity to consider the use of
hybrid instruments in reorganizations. The Court seems to leave open the
possibility that a merger of a stock savings and loan association into a mu-
tual savings and loan association can qualify as a tax-free reorganization. By
separately valuing the debt and equity attributes of mutual shares, the ma-
jority indicates that a merger qualifies as tax-free when the value of the eq-
uity characteristics outweighs the value of the debt characteristics. The
Court, however, determined that the debt value of mutual shares equals the
face value of such shares, thereby eliminating the possibility that the value of
the equity attributes will ever exceed the value of the debt attributes. As a
result, the Court has in effect halted the tax-free mergers of stock savings
and loan associations into mutual savings and loan associations.
Susan Evans Coleman
94. Id. at 638, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 555.
95. Id.
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